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INTRODUCTION
Recognition of the significance of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 19701 for the law of torts and of particular elements of the law of
torts for the administration of the Act is emerging slowly in reference to two
areas of inquiry. First, to what extent are persons charged with invocation
and application of the Act's enforcement provisions required or permitted
to read concepts of tort law into the duties imposed and the defenses allowed
under the Act?2 Second, are any new rights, remedies, or other substantive or
procedural advantages added to the arsenals of plaintiffs' attorneys seeking
redress for clients injured as a result of alleged violations of the Act?3 Before
discussing those two questions,4 this article briefly explores the broader im-
plications of the Act for the future of accident law in general.
I
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ACT FOR THE FUTURE
OF ACCIDENT LAW
Reduced to its essentials, the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
is a rather primitive system of social control designed to reduce or eliminate
hazards to employees' safety and health in the workplace.5 Rules are pre-
scribed by government agencies and enforced by government officials using
familiar coercive sanctions-monetary penalties, fines and, if necessary, jail
*Professor of Law, University of Hawaii. The author was a member of the OSHA-Ohio State
University Project which drafted a proposed state plan and statute for the State of Ohio.
1 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1970).
'See, e.g., REA Express, Inc. v. Brennan, 495 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1974); National Realty &
Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Morey, The General Duty Clause of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 86 HARV. L. REv. 988 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Morey].
3 See, e.g., Skidmore v. Travelers Ins. Co., 356 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. La.), affd per curiam, 483
F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973); Stramondo, Litigation Impact, 9 TRIAL, Jul.-Aug. 1973, at 29; Comment,
Federal Common Law Remedies Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 47 WASH. L.
REv. 629 (1972).
4 With respect to the first question, I will treat mainly the federal Act rather than state plans.
However, to the extent that the federal Act imposes obligations different from, and more strin-
gent than, the common law would require the same reasoning ought to apply to state plans.
See Occ. Safety & Health Act §§ 18(c) & (e), 29 U.S.C. §§ 667(c) & (e) (1970).
As to the second area, I will limit my discussion principally to the extent to which OSHA
safety duties may be expected to create new standards for tort liability or new causes of action.
Time and space limitations do not permit discussion in this article of other duties imposed by the
Act. See, e.g., id. §§ 8(d), 11(c) & 15, 29 U.S.C. §§ 657(d), 660(c) & 664.
5 This is intended to be descriptive. It is not intended to be critical of the Act, its important
purposes, or its ability to achieve those purposes.
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terms.6 The principal significance of the utilization by Congress of such a
primitive system of deterrence is that it constitutes another compelling piece
of evidence of widespread recognition by public policy-makers that systems
which were designed to provide compensation or individual justice for ac-
cident victims have not provided adequate deterrence against accidents. Such
recognition tends to produce legislation,7 like the Act, which relies upon di-
rect regulation to change behavior as well as other legislation, such as no-fault
schemes,8 designed to achieve restoration of accident losses. 9 This tendency,
in turn, substantially dilutes the importance of the accident reparations sys-
tem as a special deterrent to accidents. It follows that the fault system, already
under heavy attack for its high costs, delays, and unfairness, 0 will continue to
lose the support it once had from those who believed its existence necessary
to achieve such deterrence."' This withering of the fault system's raison d'etre,
coupled with a parallel trend to provide universal subsidized medical and health
care, and likely to be followed by demands for and eventual enactment of
universal protection of income loss caused by illness or accident-related dis-
ability, 12 may ultimately sound the death knell for the fault system of accident
compensation as we now know it. Its future functions may be limited to providing
optimum restoration in isolated cases where justice demands more than min-
6 0cc. Safety & Health Act § 17, 29 U.S.C. § 666 (1970).
7 See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-81 (Supp. II, 1972); Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-431 (1970).
8 Cf. O'Connell, Expanding No-Fault Beyond Auto Insurance: Some Proposals, 59 VA. L. REv.
749 (1973).
9 Rather than refer to public policy goals and strategies in terms of economic theory, see
G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970), I prefer for the purpose of this article to use
the following terminology: (The reader should note that some of these terms are similar to but
not the same as those used by Professor Calabresi.)
Prevention: the avoidance of situations or conditions which lead to accidents before such
situations or conditions occur.
Mitigation: the creation of conditions which will tend to lessen the effect of accidents when
they do occur.
Interdiction: the interposition of some instrumentality, human or otherwise, which brings to
an end an unsafe condition already in existence.
Special deterrence: the encouragement of conduct conducive to safety by creating fear of
the consequences which will follow from danger-creating acts or omissions.
General deterrence: the imposition of burdens and disadvantages on a dangerous activity,
thus making that activity less desirable than other, safer substitutes.
Correction: the development of perspectives and operations for safety in people and institutions
which would otherwise be non-safety oriented.
Restoration: the restoration of the values which are lost as a consequence of accidents which
are not prevented, interdicted, or deterred.
Miller, The Needs and Potential for Cooperation Between Human Factors Specialists and Lawyers in
Research and Development of Automobile Accident Law, 14 HUMAN FACTORS 25 (1972). The terms
are, in part, adaptations from Calabresi's work and, in part, suggested by objectives of the sanctioning
process enumerated in a rather different context. See M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND
MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION 287-96
(1961).
"See, e.g., R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM: A
BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (1965).
11 Proponents of the fault system have often emphasized its value as a deterrent to accidents.
See, e.g., THE DEFENSE RESEARCH INST., INC., FAULT: A DETERRENT TO HIGHWAY ACCIDENTS (1969).12 Cf. Bernstein, The Need for Reconsidering the Role of Workmen's Compensation, 119 U. PA. L.
Rev. 992, 1001 (1971). But cf. O'Connell, Elective No-Fault Liability Insurance for All Kinds of Accidents:
A Proposal, 1973 INS. L. J. 495, 503.
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imum restoration 13 or in areas where direct regulation cannot provide adequate
deterrence.'
4
What is curious about the trend toward direct regulation cum coercion,
is that it comes during a period when the more sophisticated observers of the
accident problem, recognizing that there are limits to the economic resources
which can or ought to be devoted to the problem, have made powerful argu-
ments in favor of an approach which would seek the most effective mix of
strategies.' 5 Nevertheless, Congress in developing the Act paid scant attention
either to the potential deterrent effect of workmen's compensation and common
law or statutory remedies or to the way in which such remedies might be inte-
grated with the Act in order to maximize its stated objectives at minimum cost.",
This narrow focus which led to the development of a massive regulatory scheme
to operate parallel to workmen's compensation, may be fully justified by
the failures of workmen's compensation to achieve adequate deterrence in
the past.' 7 However, there is less justification for Congress' failure-in the legis-
lation requiring a study of workmen's compensation which accompanied the
Act' 8 -to call for examination of the potential safety and health effects of an
expanded and improved workmen's compensation system and of whether such
a system might in conjunction with a somewhat curtailed regulatory system
achieve the goals of both systems more efficiently and cheaply.
The failure to consider such an approach also bears upon the remaining
questions to be discussed in this article. Congress' treatment of the Act's ef-
fect on existing compensation systems can only be characterized as an amateur-
ish attempt not to upset the status quo.' 9 Careful analysis of the relevant pro-
vision in the Act and the legislative history does not lead to confident predic-
tion about the specific effect of the Act on tort remedies. Similarly, Congress'
preoccupation with prevention, interdiction, and special deterrence,20 and
its confused and ambiguous discussion of the extent to which the employer's
"general duty" incorporates common law concepts,2' suggests that those who
interpret the Act should hesitate to import common law negligence standards
13 As, for example, where defendant intentionally injures plaintiff. One possible difference
between minimum restoration and optimum restoration is that the former might compensate
only for economic losses while the latter might also compensate for intangible losses, such as pain
and suffering.
"Cf. O'Connell, supra note 8.
'5 G. CALABRESI, supra note 9; Boodman, Safety and Systems Analysis, With Application to Traffic
Safety, 33 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 488 (1968).
" In legislation appended to the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Congress
did call for a study of workmen's compensation laws. Occ. Safety & Health Act § 27, 29 U.S.C.
§ 676 (1970). However, the avowed purpose was "to determine [whether] such laws provide
an adequate, prompt, and equitable system of compensation." Id. Fortunately, however, the
commission charged with implementing the study addressed itself to the relationship between
workmen's compensation and "the safety objective." NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION LAws, THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAwS 87-98 (1972).17 Cf. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAwS, COMPENDIUM ON
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 287-93 (1973).
18 Occ. Safety & Health Act § 27, 29 U.S.C. § 676 (1970).
19 See text at pp. 628-30 infra.
2 0 See note 9 supra.
21 See text at pp. 621-22 infra.
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or other potentially relevant common law principles into it. Instead, the Act
should be interpreted primarily by reference to Congress' stated policies and
objectives in relation to the nature and dimensions of the serious problems
Congress intended to solve. 22 As will be seen, only in this manner will the Act
fulfill its promise by becoming "a safety bill of rights for close to 60 million
workers. 23
II
THE RELEVANCE OF TORT CONCEPTS TO THE GENERAL DUTY
CLAUSE OF THE ACT
The key operative provisions of the Act impose upon each employer two
duties. The first, in the so-called "general duty" clause, requires that each
employer "shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place
of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or
are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees. '24 The
second requires that each employer "shall comply with occupational safety
and health standards promulgated [by the Secretary of Labor] under this
chapter. '25 A third provision applies to employees: "Each employee shall
comply with occupational safety and health standards and all rules, regula-
tions, and orders issued pursuant to this chapter which are applicable to his
own actions and conduct."2 6 The Act, however, contains no provision for en-
forcing employees' duties and no sanctions for their breach.
The question arises whether, and to what extent, elements of tort-based
duties, defenses, or other concepts may or should be referred to in applying
these duties. Discussion will focus on the general duty clause since the duty
to comply with promulgated standards, on its face and also by virtue of clear
inferences to be drawn from other provisions of the Act,2 7 is absolute and
unqualified 28 and because the legislative intent to make the employer's duty
22 See REA Express, Inc. v. Brennan, 495 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1974).
The generally accepted dimension of the occupational safety and health problem-about
14,000 workers killed each year, over 2 million disabled, and uncounted numbers affected by
occupational disease-and its costs are discussed in Statement of George P. Schultz, Secretary
of Labor, in Hearings on S. 2193 and S. 2788 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 76, 77 (1970). The actual dimensions
of the total occupational injury and disease problem may turn out to be much greater when the
more accurate statistics required by the Act are tabulated. See Statement of Jacob Clayman, Ad-
ministrative Director, Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO, in Hearings on the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970 (Oversight and Proposed Amendments) Before the Select Subcomm. on Labor
of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 178, 186 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as 1973 Oversight Hearings].
23 SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 92D CONG.,
1ST Sass., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 197Q,
at iii (Comm. Print 1971) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
24 Occ. Safety & Health Act § 5(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1970).
2 Id. § 5(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2).
26Id. § 5(b), 29 U.S.C. § 654(b).27 Variances from standards, for example, are only permitted on the narrowest of grounds.
Id. §§ 6(b)(6) & (d), 29 U.S.C. §§ 655(b)(6) & (d).
'
8 But cf. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. v. Brennan, 497 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1974) ("reasonable man"
test read into safety regulation requiring protective equipment where "necessary by reason of
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"primary" seems rather clearly to foreclose an employer's use of an employee's
violation of duty as a defense to citation for the employer's breach of his
own duties.2
9
A. Comparison With Common Law Duties
On its face the general duty clause would seem to impose a duty on em-
ployers in some respects more stringent and in other respects less strin-
gent than the common law duty to refrain from negligence. At common
law the employer was obliged only to exercise ordinary care to make his
workplace safe for his employees. He had, on the one hand, an affirma-
tive obligation to eliminate unreasonable risks that were obvious and to
make reasonable inspections in order to uncover and remove unreasonable
hazards that were not.30 On the other hand, as is true generally with respect
to the negligence standard, a calculus was devised wherein the degree of care
to be exercised was measured by balancing the magnitude of the risk and the
likelihood that it would cause injury against the burden of avoiding the risk.31
Thus, permitting a minor risk of relatively minor injury to exist might, in
theory, be deemed negligent (if such injury actually ensued) if the burden of
removing the risk was, on balance, less costly than the risk. (Subject, of course,
to the possibility that a court or jury might find the risk so improbable that
a reasonable person would not worry about it in any event.) In applying the
calculus, it is likely that both economic and technical feasibility could and did
play major roles in measuring the burden for the purpose of determining
whether a particular employer was negligent in failing to discover or elim-
inate a particular risk.32 Under the negligence standard a jury might be reluc-
tant to find, and an appellate court reluctant to uphold the finding, that an
employer was negligent for failing to eliminate a risk-even a very serious
risk-if to do so would have brought financial calamity to the employer's busi-
ness or industry. This application of the negligence standard, absolving an
employer from liability for injuries caused by hazards which were not econom-
ically feasible to eliminate, has been generally agreed to be the product of
the public policy favoring the growth of industry during the industrial rev-
olution and a resultant unwillingness to burden industry with the stricter
dudes applied in less dynamic eras.33 The more recent trend, of course, has
hazards"); Secretary of Labor v. Standard Glass Co., 1 0cc. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. 1045 (OSHRC
July 27, 1972).
2 9 Accord, REA Express, Inc. v. Brennan, 495 F.2d 822, 825 (2d Cir. 1974); National Realty
& Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1266 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
"
0See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 525-30 (4th ed. 1971) [here-
inafter cited as PROSSER]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 492-520 (1958); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 332, commentj at 181 (1965). Of course, the employee's right to recover
for breach of these duties was substantially limited by "the unholy trinity of common law defenses-
contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow servant rule." PROSSER 526-27.
"' See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947); Conway v. O'Brien,
111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940). See also PROSSER 145-49.
32 See PROSSER 145-49. Thus, for example, one of the reasons that evidence of industry cus-
tom is admissible is to establish that a particular precaution is feasible. Id. at 167-68.3 3 See generally James, Analysis of the Origin and Development of the Negligence Actions, in DEP'T
OF TRANSPORTATION, THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEGLIGENCE ACTION 35-49 (1970).
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been back toward stricter duties which impose the costs of accidents and other
failures on industry, particularly manufacturers, without regard to the
reasonableness of the defendant's actions.
34
The general duty clause of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970, on fair reading, seems to impose an absolute duty on the employer,
albeit a duty to eliminate only some risks-those that constitute "recognized
hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm
to his employees." 3 5 The employer is under no obligation, in the absence of
a specific standard, to eliminate nonrecognized hazards irrespective of the
degree of risk they create, the degree of likelihood that they will cause or are
causing death or serious physical harm, or the extent to which their nonelim-
ination might be deemed unreasonable from the standpoint of negligence law.
Further, the employer is under no duty to eliminate even recognized hazards
if they are likely to cause only serious mental or emotional, rather than
physical, harm, if they are less than "likely" to cause death or serious physical
harm, or if they are only likely to cause nonserious physical harm, even though
these situations may give rise to liability under the law of negligence.
On the other hand, the use of the word "free," under any fair interpre-
tation, does not seem to permit any negligence-type balancing of the degree
and likelihood of risk against the cost or burden of removing it. Put another
way, the balance seems to have been struck in advance by Congress when it
decided which kinds of hazards must be eliminated. 36 It would seem to follow,
therefore, at least from the application of the "plain meaning" test, that an
employer has an absolute obligation either to eliminate "recognized hazards
that are causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his em-
ployees" even if this means closing his business or incurring a severe financial
strain, or to pay the statutory penalty for failure to abate the violation.
B. Contextual and Policy Analysis
However, the "plain meaning" test is only the starting point for a contextual
analysis designed to shed further light on the interpretation of the statutory
language.37 It still remains to determine whether a meaning less absolute than
the facial interpretation can be found by reference to the legislative intent
either expressed or implied from Congress' objectives in relation to the nature
and dimensions of the problem that Congress intended to solve.
It had been suggested by one commentator that "the general duty clause
should not be read to impose liability on an employer for the existence of
statutory hazards which he cannot reasonably eliminate" and that "employers
should be allowed the defense to the general duty requirement that elimination
of a particular hazard is physically or economically impossible unless the entire
34 See generally Noel, Comparison of Strict Liability in Products Area and Auto Accident Reparations,
in id. at 67-90.
35 Occ. Safety & Health Act § 5(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1970).36 Cf. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 393-94.
37 Cf. M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & J. MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 96-97 (1967).
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employment activity is brought to a halt."3 8 However, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia, in the first definitive judicial interpretation of
the general duty clause, refused to impose a reasonableness requirement in
National Realty & Construction Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Com-
mission (OSHRC).39 Instead, the court imposed a requirement that the hazard
be preventable by feasible means:
On the one hand, the adjective [free] is unqualified and absolute: A workplace
cannot be just "reasonably free" of a hazard, or merely as free as the average
workplace in the industry. On the other hand, Congress quite clearly did not
intend the general duty clause to impose strict liability: The duty was to be an
achievable one. Congress' language is consonant with its intent only where the
"recognized" hazard in question can be totally eliminated from a workplace....
Congress intended to require elimination only of preventable hazards.4"
Avoiding the anomaly that a workplace cannot be free from hazards when
a hazard, though not preventable, is present, Judge J. Skelly Wright simply
held that a non-preventable hazard is not "recognized.141 The criterion to de-
termine whether a hazard is preventable, he wrote, is to draw its "content
from the informed judgment of safety experts.142 And further:
Hazardous conduct is not preventable if it is so idiosyncratic and implausible
in motive or means that conscientious experts, familiar with the industry, would
not take it into account in prescribing a safety program. Nor is misconduct pre-
ventable if its elimination would require methods of hiring, training, monitoring,
or sanctioning workers which are either so untested or so expensive that safety
experts would substantially concur in thinking the methods unfeasible. 43
Both the "reasonableness" requirement and the requirement that hazards
must be preventable to be recognized would require compliance officers to
overlook some workplace hazards "causing or likely to cause death or serious
physical harm." Judge Wright, however, recognized that enforcement of the
general duty clause might in some cases "threaten the economic viability of the
employer," but he recommended that, in such cases, "the Secretary should pro-
pose the precaution by way of promulgated regulations, subject to advance indus-
try comment, rather than through adventurous enforcement of the general duty
clause. '44 Thus, although the view taken by Judge Wright tends to be more
protective of employees than does the imposition of a quasi-negligence test, it
does introduce economic factors into the determination whether serious hazards
are to be permitted to continue to exist in the workplace.
I suggest that there is no warrant in the Act, in its legislative history, or
in its policy to support the importation of economic factors into the general
38 Morey 993. Early decisions of the OSHRC have applied a "reasonableness" standard. White
& Carney, OSHA Comes of Age: The Law of Work Place Environment, 28 Bus. LAw. 1309, 1312-13
(1973).39 489 F.2d 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
40 Id. at 1265-66. Accord, Brennan v. OSHRC, - F.2d - (7th Cir. 1974).
41 489 F.2d at 1266.
42 Id.
4 3 Id.44 d. at n.37. The implication is that the Secretary has the power to enforce the precaution,
but should not exercise it. It is arguable, however, that the failure of a compliance officer to bring
such a hazard to the employer's attention, if not to recommend a citation, might constitute action-
able negligence if the hazard subsequently caused injury to an employee. See text at pp. 637-
39 infra.
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duty equation. Congress declared that the purpose of the Act was "to assure
so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and health-
ful working conditions."45 While the "so far as possible" language can fairly
be read to admit of some qualifications in the assurance, there are but two
indications in the Act itself which suggest that "possible" is to be interpreted
under any circumstances to mean "by feasible means" or to be otherwise qualified
by incorporating considerations of economic burden. The first is the statement
of purpose calling for the provision of "medical criteria which will assure in-
sofar as practicable that no employee will suffer diminished health, functional
capacity, or life expectancy as a result of his work experience. '46 It is clear,
however, from the legislative history, that the qualifying words were added
only to recognize the inescapable reality that work, no matter how free from
specific safety and health hazards, may, because of inherent emotional pressures
and physical demands, nevertheless shorten life or diminish health,47 and in
addition, that it would be virtually impossible to eliminate the myriad of minor
hazards which do not threaten serious harm. Most importantly, however, the
limitation, insofar as it is one, is addressed to medical criteria-what constitutes
"serious physical harm,' 48 not to the definition of a "recognized hazard."
Secondly, section 6(b)(5) provides, in part:
The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or
harmful physical agents under this subsection, shall set the standard which most
adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence,
that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional ca-
pacity even if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by
such standard for the period of his working life.... In addition to the attain-
ment of the highest degree of health and safety protection for the employee,
other considerations shall be the latest available scientific data in the field, the
feasibility of the standards, and experience gained under this and other health
and safety laws. 49
Here, it is arguable, both from the language itself and the legislative history,
that the explicit references to feasibility and to the best available evidence
and latest available scientific data may permit standards to be set which fall
short of providing all possible safety and health,5" though it is by no means
clear that the reference is to economic feasibility rather than technical feasi-
bility.51 On their face, however, such limitations are applicable only to standards
for "toxic materials and harmful physical agents" and not to the general duty
45 Occ. Safety & Health Act § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1970).
46Id. § 2(7), 29 U.S.C. § 651(7).
47 See Remarks of Senator Dominick, in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 423, 480.
48 See OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FIELD
OPERATIONS MANUAL VIII B.I.C. (2) (1974) [hereinafter cited as FOM].
40 Occ. Safety & Health Act § 6(b)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1970) (emphasis added).
'0 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1188.
51 Questions of feasibility may arise with respect to a number of different standard setting
problems, such as: (1) ability to determine whether a substance or physical agent constitutes a
hazard, (2) ability to determine which levels of the substance or agent are safe and which are not,
(3) ability to detect whether hazardous levels of the substance or agent are present or being used
in the workplace, (4) ability to devise means to keep the workplace free of toxic substances or
harmful physical agents, (5) ability to produce and deliver equipment which would enable an
employer to detect and/or eliminate the hazard from the workplace, and (6) economic ability of
particular employers or an entire industry to comply with proposed standards.
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clause or to standards for other hazards.5 2 Reference to the legislative his-
tory also suggests that the special limitations on the requirements for these
standards arose out of recognition that the identification of which of the myriad
of substances, chemicals, and physical agents already used in industry and
being added each year are toxic and harmful to health presents intractable
problems, 53 as does the ability of the National Institute of Occupational
Safety and Health (NIOSH) to formulate standards calling for threshold
limit values or other adequate protections. 54
It must be conceded, however, that the toxic substances provision consti-
tutes a crack in the dike of absolute protection which the Act otherwise seems
to require. If Congress wanted protection "insofar as possible" it could have
required industry to establish the safety of new substances and physical agents
before introducing them into the workplace and to remove those whose safety
has not been established.5 5 It should be clear, however, that this crack permits
only a leak and not a flood: not only is the provision limited in its terms to
a particular class of cases, but it has no applicability once a standard has been
set or a recognized hazard noted. Thus, for example, the Conference Report,
.in the same paragraph in which this provision is discussed, states that "lelco-
nomic hardship is not to be a consideration for the qualification for a temporary
extension order."56 Evidence could not be stronger that Congress foresaw and
approved the requirement that safety and health be provided regardless of
the economic hardship on a particular employer. 57
It appears that, Judge Wright's interpretation of "recognized" aside, the
absence of any other language in the Act qualifying or limiting the requirement
that employment be free from certain recognized hazards is not merely a neutral
Senator Dominick introduced the amendment containing the feasibility requirement with re-
spect to toxic substances and harmful physical agents. See LEGISATIvE HISTORY 502. It seems
clear that Senator Dominick was concerned with (4), the ability to keep certain employments
free of safety and health hazards, when the employment was "inherently dangerous," id., or
when the employee could not avoid being exposed to hazards such as those inevitably present
for a bus driver or trolley car operator in traffic situations, id. at 423, 480.
In addition, the enormous concern for occupational diseases caused by toxic subst .. Zes and
harmful physical agents expressed in the hearings, see, e.g., Statement of Anthony Mazzocchi,
Director, Citizenship-Legislative Department, Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, AFL-
CIO, in Hearings on S. 2193 and S. 2788 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor
and Public Welfare, 91st Cong., Ist & 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 1007 (1970), and echoed in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY 844-46, seem to lead to the conclusion that Congress' expressed policy to provide safe
and healthful employment so far as possible would be disserved by providing economic hardship
exceptions in cases where it is technically feasible both to detect hazardous levels of toxic substances
and harmful physical agents in the environment and technically feasible to eliminate them.
Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has determined, both as a
matter of policy and by virtue of the limited scope ofjudidal review, that the Secretary may take
economic factors into account under section 6(b)(5) of the Act. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO
v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1974). This decision deserves reconsideration.
52 Occ. Safety & Health Act §§ 6(b)(5) & (7), 29 U.S.C. §§ 655(b)(5) & (7) (1970).
5 3 Cf. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 337-39, 1043-45.54 Cf id. at 859.
55 Id.
56 See id. at 1188.5 7 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO
v. Hodgson, 499 F. 2d at 478 (dictum), and National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F. 2d
at 1266 n.37 (dictum), recognized that economic hardship might not provide a defense to a'
particular employer.
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factor, which might permit free-wheeling judicial or administrative inter-
pretation and qualification, but a positive indication that Congress confronted
and resolved in the negative the issue of whether economic considerations
were to be taken into account in applying and enforcing the general duty
clause. Consider, for example, the ease with which Congress could have
qualified the clause by using appropriate language drawn from negligence
law and its ability to do so as demonstrated by the definition of a "serious vio-
lation"58 and by the use of "reasonableness" language in other provisions of
the Act59 and in other regulatory laws which have been interpreted to permit
consideration of economic factors. 60 Congress could have said "reasonably
free from.., hazards" or "free from recognized hazards that are causing
or likely to cause an unreasonable risk of death or serious physical harm to
employees." It did neither. Furthermore, in the debates individual senators
and congressmen recognized the absolute nature of the Act's duties.61 But
most telling, perhaps, is the reference in both the Senate and House reports
to an employer's general obligation under the Act "to bring no adverse ef-
fects to the life and health of [his] employees throughout the course of their
employment.
62
The puzzling inconsistency between the assertions in the committee re-
ports of both houses63 that the general duty clause imposes common law
duties, not an absolute duty, and that it calls for "no adverse effects" may be
explained most plausibly by attributing to the committees an ignorance of
the requirements of the common law. 64 Alternatively, the committees may
3s Occ. Safety & Health Act § 17(j), 29 U.S.C. § 6660) (1970). A serious violation of the Act
exists "if there is a substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result" and
the employer knew or by exercising reasonable diligence could have known of the violation.
The difference between a serious and nonserious violation is that penalties "shall" be assessed
for the former, id. § 17(b), 29 U.S.C. § 666(b), but "may" be assessed for the latter, id. § 17(c),
29 U.S.C. § 666(c). The Field Operations Manual states: "Citations based on the general duty clause
should be limited to alleged serious violations." FOM VIII A.2.d. The reason given is that sections
17(k) and 5(a)(1) of the Act, describing serious and general duty clause violations, use "virtually
identical language." Id. A comparison of the two sections will reveal that the description of a general
duty violation and a serious violation differ substantially. Indeed, there is no basis in the Act or
in its policy for holding that a citation may not be issued for a violation of section 5(a)(1) unless
it is serious as defined under section 17(k).
"I See, e.g., Occ. Safety & Health Act §§ 3(8), 8(a)(2), 10(a), 10(c), & 16, 29 U.S.C. §§ 652(8),
657(a)(2), 659(a), 659(c), & 665 (1970). Cf. H.K. Porter Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 1 0cc. SAFETY
& HEALTH REP. 1600, 1605 (OSHRC Mar. 22, 1974).
60 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1392(a) & (f) (1970). See also Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 628 (1970); Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2056(a) (Supp. I,
1972). Former state occupational safety and health laws also limited employers' duties to the
exercise of reasonable care. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§4101.01(k), 4101.11, 4101.12
(Page 1973).
There was a provision in the administration bill which would have permitted the standard
setting board to "provide such reasonable limitations and.., make ... rules and regulations
allowing reasonable variations, tolerances, and exemptions to and from any or all of the provisions
under this Act as it may find advisable and proper in the public interest." LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
57, 705. However, in final passage this section was limited to "reasonable variations, tolerances,
and exemptions ... necessary and proper to avoid serious impairment of the national defense."
Occ. Safety & Health Act § 16, 29 U.S.C. § 665 (1970) (emphasis added).61 See, e.g., Statement of Senator Saxbe, in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 345.
62 Id. at 149, 851 (emphasis added).
63 Id.
64 For example, both reports contain the overbroad statement that "[u]nder principles of
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have been referring either to the negligence standard as it has developed into
virtually absolute liability under the F.E.L.A., 65 or to more recent judge-
made doctrines of liability developed in the products liability area, or, quite
erroneously, to workmen's compensation. If the reference is to F.E.L.A.
standards, it is at least arguable that a negligence-type calculus, albeit a very
stringent one,66 might be applied in determining whether a violation of the
general duty clause has been made out. Under this calculus the economic
burden on the employer might become relevant. Congress' view that the duty
is not an absolute one, however, may also be explained by the fact that the duty is
hedged with expressed limitations.67 The better approach, I suggest, is to forego
an attempt to fashion clarity from confusion and instead to recognize either
that the language in the reports was deliberately fudged or that it was not
written by a lawyer terribly conversant with tort law.
Finally, practical and policy considerations provide strong support for
an interpretation which excludes relevance for considerations of feasibility
or economic hardship with respect to a particular employer. In the first place,
neither compliance officers nor their area directors are likely to be in a position
to assess economic factors in order to determine whether removal of a par-
ticular hazard will cause an employer undue hardship. Secondly, the general
duty clause is already limited to hazards which are causing or likely to cause
serious physical consequences. It is inconsistent with the entire tenor of the
Act and its history to permit hazards of such dimension to continue because
their removal would cause economic harm to the employer. Thirdly, there is
a policy favoring uniformity of application of the Act among all employers
regardless of size.6 8 Workplaces of large employers probably tend to be rel-
atively less hazardous than workplaces of small employers performing the same
or similar operations. 69 However, to permit recognized serious hazards to
exist in small businesses because of economic considerations, but to require
large firms in the same industry to abate the same hazards, would constitute
an unfair advantage to the small firms, an advantage subsidized by the health
and safety of their workers. While Congress recognized the problem of achiev-
ing uniform high standards of health and safety in small as well as large work-
places, it responded only by making loans available from the Small Business
Administration to assist small employers70 and by requiring the Secretary
of Labor to consider the size of the employer's business in setting penalties
common law, individuals are obliged to refrain from actions which cause harm to others." Id.
65 The report of the Senate Committee refers expressly to F.E.L.A. Id. at 851. In addition,
in describing to Senator Dominick how the Act would operate, Senator Saxbe used as his example
a famous F.E.L.A. case, Gallick v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 372 U.S. 108 (1963), involving liability
for a "bug bite." LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 345.
66 In damages actions under F.E.L.A., "the test of a jury case is simply whether the proofsjustify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest,
in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought." Rogers v. Missouri P.R.R.,
352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957).
6:7 See text at p. 617 supra.
6 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 144.
69 See Statement of Jacob Clayman, Administrative Director, Industrial Union Department,
AFL-CIO, in 1973 Oversight Hearings 183.
70 15 U.S.C. § 636(b)(5) (1970).
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for violations of the Act.71 Congress did not provide for exceptions or variances
based on employer size.
If the foregoing analysis, rejecting a negligence-type calculus, is correct
a further problem arises: how to deal with situations, not mentioned in the Act
and not clearly recognized in the legislative history, in which it would be lu-
dicrous, grossly unfair, or unwarranted by implied policy to penalize or even
order abatement of certain hazards in particular industries or lines of employ-
ment. Such situations include employments of great public importance or
which, as a class, have obvious and virtually universal public and congres-
sional approbation but which cannot be carried on without the presence of
some such hazards. Examples include professional athletics, police work, fire
prevention, explosives manufacturing, and some kinds of scientific experi-
mentation.7 2 It is here7 3 that the qualification "so far as possible," found in
the Act's statement of purposes and policy, should be applied. In such employ-
ments, hazards should not be deemed violations of the general duty clause
if such hazards are not preventable except by prohibiting the activity or by
rendering the activity ineffective to serve its public purpose. On the other hand,
the existence of hazards which could be mitigated or prevented by the enforce-
ment of safety rules, by the use of protective devices, or by other means which
permit the activity to be carried on effectively would still constitute general
duty violations.
The rationale for this special class of exceptions is neither that the general
duty clause applies only to hazards preventable by feasible means, as suggested
by Judge Wright in National Realty,74 nor that public interest and public util-
ity may be fed into a negligence-type calculus to determine whether enforce-
ment is "feasible." Rather, it is simply that Congress cannot be assumed to
have intended to close such employments without substantial debate and without
expressly so providing.in the Act. However, it should never be lightly presumed
that a particular employment falls within this class of "implied" exceptions,
since the existence of such a class can only be justified as a necessary and limited
exception to the general view that Congress only intended exemptions and
variances which it expressly wrote into the Act.
C. The Feasibility Criterion
Even if OSHA officers may not, by virtue of the foregoing analysis, take
economic considerations into account or otherwise predicate their decision
to issue a citation for a general duty violation on a determination of reason-
ableness, the question remains whether the court in National Realty was cor-
71 Occ. Safety & Health Act § 17(i), 29 U.S.C. § 666(i) (1970).
7 2 Employments which contain some inherent dangers from outside factors over which an
employer has no control-such as traffic hazards to bus drivers-and which are therefore in-
herently dangerous, may also be included in this category. See LEGIsLATIVW HIsToRY 480. See also
FOM VIII A.2.c.(2).
73 And in the provision allowing exceptions for reasons of national security. Occ. Safety &
Health Act § 16, 29 U.S.C. § 665 (1970).
74 National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d at 1266. Cf. Brennan v. OSHRC, - F.2d
- (3d Cir. 1974) ("so far as possible" language suggests that section 5(a)(1) duty must be achievable).
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rect in limiting the general duty to those hazards which are recognized by
safety experts as preventable by feasible means.7 5
Judge Wright's approach in National Realty does have several virtues ab-
sent in the "reasonableness" approach. (1) Presumably, compliance officers and
others charged with the enforcement of the Act will find it easier to discover
and apply safety experts' views of preventability and feasibility than to make
an on-the-scene evaluation of reasonableness during each inspection. (2) To
the extent that safety experts tend to develop industry-wide standards, rather
than standards for particular businesses, there is little risk of preferential
treatment for small businesses.7 6 And (3), the approach appears consistent
with a general legislative intent to draw heavily on the expertise of occupa-
tional safety and health experts. 77
On the other hand, this approach raises significant practical and policy
problems.78 In the first place, the statutory language says "recognized" and
not "recognized and feasibly preventable." While the legislative history re-
flected much confusion about the meaning of the word "recognized," including
who would do the recognizing,7 9 the question of preventability only arose
with respect to assertions that it would be unfair to penalize an employer for
failing to eliminate a hazard he did not or could not know existed.80 Judge
Wright's approach also suggests erroneously that safety experts would only
give "recognition" to feasibly preventable hazards. While possibly true with
respect to experts employed by management, there is nothing in the court's
opinion or in the legislative history to suggest that the words "recognized
hazard" constitute a term of art with such meaning among safety experts,
and there is some more recent evidence that it does not.8 ' Further, because of
the broad coverage of the Act there may well be many types of employments
and, indeed, industries in which safety standards have not been developed
by experts. In such situations, serious hazards may develop which are rec-
ognized by the employer himself or by most of the employers in the industry.
It was presumably one of the purposes of the general duty clause to reach
and prevent such hazards.8 2 To deny OSHA officials the power after an in-
spection to cite for hazards that are generally known to exist in the industry,
751 d.
"
6 But see id. n.37.
77 Various sections of the Act require the Secretary of Labor to draw advice from safety ex-
perts. See, e.g., Occ. Safety & Health Act §§ 7(a)(1) & (b), 20, 29 U.S.C. §§ 656(a)(1) & (b), 669
(1970).
7s The requirement that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration henceforth
bear the burden of proving the feasible means by which the hazard could be prevented, National
Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d at 1266, would require compliance officers to be trained
not only in how to recognize violations, a difficult enough task, but how to avoid them, a matter
better left to experts familiar with the business or industry. See, e.g., Secretary of Labor v. Getter
Trucking, Inc., 1 0cc. SAF'rY & HEALTH REP. 1743 (OSHRC Apr. 30, 1974).
9 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 346. See also Morey 995-96, 1001-02. Cf. National Realty &
Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d at 1265.
so See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 877, 881. See also id. at 380.
s In Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, for example, the recommendations of NIOSH,
presumably based on expert determinations, for immediate implementation of standards for as-
bestos dust were delayed for two years by the Secretary of Labor in order to take into account
problems of economic feasibility ignored by NIOSH experts. 499 F.2d at 479.
82 See, e.g., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 149, 851-52.
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that are obvious, or that are actually known by the employer"3 would be de-
moralizing to both compliance officers and to the employees whose safety and
health the Act was designed to protect. Finally, there is nothing in the Act
or its history to suggest that a statutory hazard, once recognized, should not
be prevented by closing down the employments in which it exists in those
rare cases when no more feasible means are available. To the extent that such
power exists, all such hazards are preventable.8 4 Indeed, the National Realty
court's only relevant citations 8s-to the "so far as possible" language in the
purposes clause, to language of the House committee report which asserts
that (an earlier, though more expansive version of) the general duty clause
protects workers from "preventable" dangers, and to the definition of "duty"
in section 4 of the Restatement of Torts86-do indeed suggest that the general
duty only applies to preventable hazards, but in no way support the view that
preventability is limited by feasibility.
7
D. The Meaning of "Recognized"
Although feasibility and other elements of the negligence calculus are
thus not part of the determination, the proper definition of "recognized" and
"likely" still requires clarification. However, the legislative history provides no
clear-cut definition of what constitutes a "recognized" hazard.8 8 What does
seem clear is that Congress did not adopt the standard of knowledge and knowl-
edgeability, including the duty to inspect for hazards, which would be required
by common law of employer-invitors to employee-business visitors.8 9 That
standard, like other negligence concepts mentioned earlier, would be dif-
ficult to apply efficiently in the Act's administrative enforcement scheme.90
On the other hand, requiring employers to know of and eliminate hazards
83 It is by no means clear that National Realty requires this result. The court merely held that
a hazard which safety experts deemed feasibly preventable was "recognized." It was not called
upon to decide whether hazards generically recognized by most of the members of an industry
or actually recognized by a particular employer, though not acknowledged by safety experts,
would be deemed recognized. The thrust of the decision suggests they might be so recognized
if, but only if, their prevention was feasible. 489 F.2d at 1265 n.32, 1265-67. However, the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that a hazard is recognized if personally known to
the employer. Brennan v. OSHRC, - F.2d - (8th Cir. 1974).
84 Morey 993.
85 489 F.2d at 1266 n.35.
86 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 4 (1965).
87 The National Realty court cites section 4 to support its view that "the very word duty implies
an obligation capable of achievement." 489 F.2d at 1266 n.35. That may be true, but refraining
from an activity is one means of fulfilling an obligation. Furthermore, comment b to section 4
makes it clear that the section only defines "duty" in the context of the law of negligence, RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 4, comment b (1965), as opposed to duties which may arise under other
tort rules.
88 Cf. Morey 995-96, 1001-03. See also FOM VIII A.2.b.(1).
89 Senator Dominick offered an amendment to the Senate bill which would have substituted
"readily apparent" for "recognized." LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 380.
980 Except, of course, in obvious cases. Such determinations are necessary in order to establish
a serious violation, Occ. Safety & Health Act § 17(j), 29 U.S.C. § 6660) (1970). However, there
is no compelling reason for compliance officers to prove that a violation is serious rather than
nonserious. Compare id. § 17(b), 29 U.S.C. § 666(b), with id. § 17(c), 29 U.S.C. § 666(c).
625
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
(1) generally understood by "conscientious" safety experts 1 or by members of
the industry to exist in a particular industry or type of business,9 1a (2) obvious
on visual inspection of the workplace, or (3) actually known by the employer,lb
would be fairly easy to administer by compliance officers and would not impose
an excessive burden on employers to expend large sums searching out risks
not generally known to exist in the particular employment. It would, however,
require them to keep abreast of safety developments in their industry.
This interpretation of the "recognized" requirement has the virtue of
avoiding distortion of the plain meaning of words which, with increasing
justification, is likely to irritate laymen, especially those whose safety and health
are supposed to be protected by the Act. It is not unreasonable to infer that
a serious hazard the existence of which is obvious to the senses or which has
specifically been brought to the employer's attention has been "recog-
nized." But most persuasive is the argument that the suggested interpretation
is consistent with the underlying policy of the Act "to assure so far as possible
every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working con-
ditions."
E. The Meaning of "Likely"
The requirement that the hazard be "causing or likely to cause" serious
harm should in no event be equated with the preponderance of evidence re-
quirement of the burden of proof in negligence cases, as seemed to be the case
in the original Compliance Operations Manual.92 To require that a compliance
officer establish more likely than not that a serious injury will occur as the
result of a particular hazard would all but eliminate the effectiveness of the
general duty clause, particularly in industries where recognized hazards abound
but few employees of any particular small employer have a better than 50 per
cent chance of suffering harm from a particular hazard in any given period of
time. Even if the general duty clause were held to impose a negligence-type
standard of care on employers, the likelihood of harm under the negligence
calculus would only have to be unreasonably great in view of the seriousness
of the harm and the burden of avoiding it; even a slight possibility might suf-
fice in some cases.9 3 It is evident that the drafters of the Manual misapplied
the burden required to establish a violation-a preponderance of the ev-
idence94-to the question whether there is sufficient likelihood that the hazard
will cause harm.
11 National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d at 1266.9 l American Smelting & Refining Co. v. OSHRC, - F.2d - (8th Cir. 1974).
91b Brennan v. OSHRC, - F.2d - (8th Cir. 1974).
92 See OSHA, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, COMPLIANCE OPERATIONS MANUAL VIII-2 (1972). The
OSHRC, however, has held that the term " 'likely' denotes a higher degree of probability than a
mere possibility." Secretary of Labor v. Arizona Pub. Serv. Co., 1 0cc. SAFETY & HEALTH REP.
1369 (OSHRC Oct. 18, 1973). The relevant provision of the Compliance Operations Manual has been
omitted from the Field Operations Manual, FOM VIII A.2.b.(2).
93 PROSSER 145-49.94 See Secretary of Labor v. Armor Elevator Co., 1 0cc. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. 1409 (OSHRC
Nov. 20, 1973).
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This still leaves open the question of how likely the advent of serious harm
has to be in order to meet the statutory standard of likelihood. Richard Morey
has suggested that the appropriate test is "plausibility, not probability" or
"whether reasonably foreseeable circumstances could lead to the perceived
hazards resulting in serious physical harm or death."95 Judge Wright in Na-
tional Realty accepted and embellished the plausibility test: "If evidence is
presented that a practice could eventuate in serious physical harm upon other
than a freakish or utterly implausible concurrence of circumstances, the Com-
mission's expert determination of likelihood should be accorded considerable
deference by the courts. '96 Since there is no indication of the required de-
gree of likelihood, the word likely alone does not really provide much illumina-
tion. Therefore, Judge Wright's solution, to leave the matter, within limits,
to the expert determination (more likely the informed discretion) of the OSHRC
is a fair resolution of the issue.
F. Conclusion
It follows from the foregoing analysis that the general duty clause pro-
vides a qualified absolute standard for safety rather than a relative standard
balanced by considerations of economic or other feasibility. In view of the
dimensions of the safety problem, such a standard does not seem excessively
harsh, particularly if the existing qualifications are considered. A hazard has
to be recognized, not merely recognizable by a reasonably prudent man under
the same or similar circumstances. The hazard has to be causing or threatening
death or serious harm, thereby excluding risks of only minor harm which
might be encompassed by a negligence standard. The threat has to be one
of physical harm, not of emotional harm, which is increasingly becoming
actionable under negligence law. And the hazard is only actionable if it is
causing or likely to cause the statutory harm, thus possibly excluding some
hazards which might have been actionable under negligence law if injury in fact
ensued. With these significant qualifications it does not seem unreasonable for
Congress to have decided to eliminate all such statutory hazards from the work-
place. To say that an employer must eliminate such hazards from the workplace
is not the same as saying that the employer's duty is absolute or that he is an
insurer, as those terms are used in tort law or in the Act's legislative history.
That the cost of eliminating the hazards might cause some marginal or unavoid-
ably hazardous employments to shut down may be unfortunate, but no more un-
fortunate than forcing the closing of establishments that cannot afford to comply
with tort duties or that are rendered bankrupt by tortjudgments. To adopt an in-
terpretation of the general duty clause more qualified than that offered here
would deny to workers the "safety bill of rights" promised when the Act was
passed, both by weakening their protection against serious injury-creating
hazards and by imposing difficult decisions and evidentiary burdens on an
inspection and enforcement staff already inadequate to achieve the Act's ob-
jectives with respect to all covered employments.
95 Morey 997-98.
96 489 F.2d at 1265 n.33.
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III
THE EFFECT OF THE ACT ON TORT REMEDIES
While administrative regulation of safety and health may and frequently
does affect the rights of the class intended to be protected by the legislation
and the corresponding liability of those subject to regulation, the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970 contains express language designed to minimize,
if not to eliminate, such effect:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to supersede or in any manner af-
fect any workmen's compensation law or to enlarge or diminish or affect in
any other manner the common law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of
employers and employees under any law with respect to injuries, diseases, or
death of employees arising out of, or in the course of, employment.97
Although this section on its face seems clearly to prohibit effects on common
law and statutory rights, as well as on workmen's compensation, the legis-
lative history reflects the same sort of confusion about what is meant by com-
mon law rights that was observed with respect to the nature of the duties im-
posed by the general duty clause. Thus, both Senate and House committee
reports indicate an intention not to "affect any Federal or state workmen's
compensation laws, or the rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and em-
ployees under them,' ' 8 but are silent as to intention with respect to other com-
mon law and statutory rights. That the language of the section prohibits af-
fecting such rights only "with respect to injuries, diseases, or death of employees
arising out of, or in the course of employment," and that the emphasized
phrase constitutes a term of art under workmen's compensation law, hardly
excludes the possibility that rights other than those provided under work-
men's compensation acts might be created by such injury, disease, or death.
Whatever the intention, however, the Act will unavoidably have an effect
on some common law rights and possibly on rights under workmen's com-
pensation. This consequence flows from the fact that workmen in some
states still retain the right to sue their employers at common law or by statute
for damages for work-related injuries. 99 In addition, workmen's compensation
benefits are increased in some states if the injured employee can prove that
his injury was caused by his employer's violation of a safety statute or regula-
tion. 00 Thus, to the extent that existing state safety statutes and administrative
regulations are changed or eliminated as a result of the Act, either by replace-
ment by federal standards' 0 ' or by different state standards promulgated un-
der a state plan, employees' rights and employers' obligations, either under
"I Occ. Safety & Health Act § 4(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (1970).
98 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 162, 864 (emphasis added).
99 See 2 A. LARSON, THE LAw OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 67 (1974). In about two-thirds
of the states, workmen or employees may elect to retain common law rights and duties.
100 See id. § 69. See, e.g., OHIO CONsT. art. 2, § 35.
101 State occupational safety and health standards, whether statutory or promulgated by
administrative regulation, are by clear implication preempted by the Act except in two situations,(1) Where no federal standard is in effect with respect to particular occupational safety or health
issues, the state may continue to enforce state standards applicable to those issues, Occ. Safety
& Health Act § 18(a), 29 U.S.C. § 667(a) (1970). (2) Where a state plan is approved, the state may
enforce its own standard with respect to issues covered by the plan. Language in the administra-
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doctrines such as negligence per se'0° or under the workmen's compensation
surcharge, must likewise change.
A sensible reading of the section, therefore, would seem to bar the implica-
tion of new statutory causes of action for damages under the Act, at least in
suits by employees against their employers, 10 3 but permit new or different
safety and health regulations promulgated under the Act, or under state plans,
to be used in other actions to the same extent non-OSHA safety and health
regulations are permitted to be used. 10 4 While this interpretation is not without
its difficulties, it has the virtue of keeping standards of care in negligence
cases in conformity with standards required by the Act and of avoiding the
confusion which might be caused by the existence of two divergent sets of
regulations in states which permit a workmen's compensation surcharge. Most
importantly, the broad safety and health objectives of the Act may be supported,
and chance of their achievement enhanced, by permitting OSHA standards
to be given effect in private actions. Even without Congress' expression of
intention not to affect existing rights, the usual reasons advanced for implying
a cause of action-that adequate state remedies are not available, that uniform
effects are required nationwide, or that a statutory cause of action is necessary
to support the legislative policy' 05-do not at this time seem to be very cogent
here. It should be noted for future reference, however, that further deteri-
oration of workmen's compensation benefits relative to workers' salaries and
the inflated dollar could so cheapen the cost of workmen's compensation that
employers might find it less expensive to avoid taking costly measures to come
into compliance with the Act and risk OSHA penalties 10 6 than to prevent worker
harm. In such event, incentives to employer self-enforcement would be diluted,
justifying a re-examination of whether a statutory cause of action might be
necessary to achieve the Act's policies.
Assuming some effect for OSHA standards in private damage actions,
several questions remain. (1) Should violations of specific standards constitute
conclusive evidence of negligence? (2) If not conclusive, what is the relevance
of such a violation? (3) Should violation of the general duty clause be given
the same effect as a violation of a specific standard? (4) To what extent should
compliance with OSHA standards or the general duty clause constitute ev-
tion bill which would have avoided preemption except in cases of actual conflict between state
and federal standards was not included in the bill. See LEGISLATIVE HISToRY 27. Cf. Columbus
Coated Fabrics v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, - F.2d - (6th Cir. 1974).
102 See generally PROSSER 200-04.
103 Accord, Byrd v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 496 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1974); Russell v. Bartley,
494 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 1974); Skidmore v. Travelers Ins. Co., 356 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. La.), affd
per curiam, 483 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973); Hare v. Federal Compress & Warehouse Co.,
359 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Miss. 1973). But see Comment, Federal Common Law Remedies Under
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 47 WASH. L. REv. 629 (1972). Unaccountably,
this Comment does not take into consideration the prohibition of section 4(b)(4) of the
Act, Occ. Safety & Health Act § 4(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (1970).104 See generally Morris, The Role of Administrative Safety Measures in Negligence Actions, 28 TExAs
L. REv. 143 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Morris].
1
o' See Note, Implying Civil Remedies From Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARV. L. REv. 285,
291-96 (1963).
106 Penalties have tended to be low except for repeated or willful violations or continuing
failures to abate a violation.
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idence of due care? (5) What is the relevance of compliance or noncompliance
with OSHA standards in employees' third party actions against (a) employers
of persons other than the employee-plaintiff, (b) non-employers, and (c) fel-
low employees? (6) Will an employee's violation of his duties under the Act
constitute a complete or partial defense, under contributory negligence or
comparative negligence, in actions brought by the employee to recover damages
for his injuries? And, (7) should failures by persons charged with enforcement
of the Act, such as compliance officers, give rise to private damage actions
by employees or employers? 107
A. Actions By an Employee Against His Employer
1. Using the Act Offensively
In those situations where an employee retains a common law right of
action for negligence against his employer, the effect of proof of the em-
ployer's violation of a specific standard or his general duty under the Act
should turn on whether violation of such duty or standard is necessarily a
failure to exercise due care or only constitutes evidence thereof. 08 The neg-
ligence calculus has already been shown to be irrelevant to whether an em-
ployer has violated the general duty clause. 109 Similarly, there is nothing in
the Act or its legislative history which suggests that specific standards are to
be developed on the basis of what safety and health precautions are "reasonable"
either for an entire industry" or for specific employers."' It follows, then,
that violation by an employer of his general duty or specific standards ought
not to constitute conclusive evidence of negligence.
On the other hand, violations of duties under the Act should properly be
admitted as evidence of negligence. In the first place, it can be argued that
employers who fail to comply with mandatory safety regulations without
justification are acting unreasonably."12 Further, the existence of specific
standards will generally constitute evidence that an employer knew or should
107 Other questions relating to the effect of the Act in tort actions, such as the use of records
kept by employers as evidence, the use of testimony by OSHA compliance officers, admissibility
and other uses of medical records, and the extent to which breach of duties created by the Act
but not directly related to safety, such as the prohibition against discrimination, Occ. Safety &
Health Act § 11(c), 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1970), and the Secretary's duty to protect trade secrets,
id. § 15, 29 U.S.C. § 664, give rise to possible tort actions, will not be discussed here. See generally
Stramondo, Litigation Impact, 9 TRIAL, Jul.-Aug. 1973, at 29.10 See generally Morris.
I.: See text at pp. 616-27 supra. Negligence may be relevant, however, in determining
whether a violation is "serious." See Occ. Safety & Health Act § 17(j), 29 U.S.C. §6660) (1970).
"'°But see Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 477-78 (Secretary of
Labor may consider economic feasibility).
II In Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, the court stated that "the concept of economic
feasibility [does not] necessarily guarantee the continued existence of individual employers."
Id. at 478. See also Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLUM. L. Rav. 1147, 1161-63 (1942).
112 In such cases evidence of violation should be treated as negligence per se. See Arthur v.
Flota Mercante Gran Centro Americana S.A., 487 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1973) (violation of OSHA
standard held negligence per se). See also Morris 147-48. The same reasoning applies to a failure
to abate a hazard after a citation and abatement order have been issued, Occ. Safety & Health
Act § 17(d), 29 U.S.C. § 666(d) (1970), and to a failure to comply with a posting requirement,
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have known of the hazard the regulation was designed to eliminate, 113 al-
though it should be open for an employer, particularly a small one, to show
that because the Act's administrators failed to provide adequate notice or
because of other special circumstances, it was not unreasonable for him or for
employers in his business or industry to be unaware of the hazard.' 4 An
individual employer should also be permitted to offer evidence to show
that it was not unreasonable for him to fail to comply with a particular stan-
dard either because the burden of compliance exceeded the risk and likelihood
of injury or because, although not in compliance, his place of employment
was, by virtue of other safety or health measures, as safe as it would have
been if he had been in compliance. 1 5
The general duty, too, may require more than reasonable conduct.1 6
In addition, violations of the general duty are particularly inappropriate for
negligence per se standards because their generality is almost equal to that
of the negligence standard itself. However, because an employer only violates
his general duty when the hazard is "recognized," proof of such violation
should establish that the employer knew or should have known of the hazard
because it was generally known in the industry, obvious or actually known
to the employer, or because the Act creates a special duty to keep abreast of the
opinions of safety experts. The employer has a heavy burden, indeed, if he
tries to show that because of his special circumstances he reasonably failed
to know of a widely recognized or obvious hazard. Further, proof of a general
duty violation tends to show that the risk was of death or "serious physical
harm," and that the hazard was "likely" to cause such harm, as those terms
are defined under the Act.
While violations of the Act may constitute evidence of negligence, ad-
mission of specific determinations issuing or upholding citations or penal-
ties under the Act should be viewed with caution. From a practical perspec-
tive, enforcement of the Act, particularly the work of the OSHRC, could be
burdened and hampered if employers charged with injury-associated viola-
tions felt compelled to contest and perhaps appeal each citation or penalty
issued for such violations in order to avoid the powerful effect of having such
determinations introduced in evidence at trial of a negligence claim." 7 On
the other hand, employers not aware of possible evidentiary uses are un-
likely to contest even unwarranted citations as to which there are no penal-
id. § 17(h), 29 U.S.C. § 666(h). In the latter situation, however, plaintiff might still have difficulty
proving that the failure to post a notice was a proximate cause of his injuries.
"'See Morris 150-51. Moreover, violation of section 17(d), failure to abate after citation,
would constitute evidence of actual knowledge. Occ. Safety & Health Act § 17(d), 29 U.S.C. § 666(d)
(1970).
114 Morris 158.
"'! This situation is similar to nonconformity to industry custom, as opposed to subconformity.
See generally Morris, supra note 111.
""See National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d at 1265 n.34. Furthermore, the
court stipulated that "employers have a general duty to do virtually everything possible to prevent
and repress hazardous conduct by employees." Id. at 1268 (emphasis added).
17 The Occupational Safety and Health Administration gives priority in determining which
employers to inspect to employments where injuries have actually occurred. FOM IV-1 to -2.
Most of the contested cases dealt with by the OSHRC involve actual injuries. See generally Decisions,
I Occ. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (1974).
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ties assessed or, as is the usual case, as to which only light penalties are
assessed. In such cases it would be unfair to give OSHA determinations
evidentiary weight.
Where citations are contested and taken to the OSHRC there is some-
what greater justification for admitting the OSHRC finding into evidence.
Hearing examiners use a "preponderance of the evidence" standard of proof
in determining whether to affirm, modify, or set aside a citation or
penalty.' An employer aggrieved by the hearing examiner's decision may
seek discretionary review by the OSHRC itself. 1 9 If granted, the Commis-
sion will apply the same burden of proof. Thus, it can be argued that an em-
ployer who contests a violation and has a hearing before an examiner, and
possibly the entire Commission, has actually had his day in court and, there-
fore, should not be permitted to contest the admissibility of the Commission's
decision in a negligence action. However, there are countervailing consid-
erations: the wide coverage of the Act which includes very small businesses
and marginal employers, gives substance to the need for simple, informal,
inexpensive, and lawyerless review procedures if such employers are to
have a fair opportunity to contest citations and penalties. If OSHRC deter-
minations become admissible in negligence actions, only uninformed em-
ployers will dare contest injury-associated citations and penalties without
a lawyer. Moreover, if, as recommended above, uncontested citations and
penalties are excluded from evidence in negligence actions, then it would be
unwise to admit contested determinations, since to do so might discourage
employers from contesting at all. In short, the "damages-action" tail
should not be permitted to wag the OSHA dog; OSHA dispute-settlement
machinery should not be encumbered with effects beyond those provided
in the Act itself.
2. Using the Act Defensively
Violation of OSHA standards and rules is no more conclusive of an em-
ployer's negligence than is compliance conclusive of due care. The fact that
an employer has complied with all promulgated standards does not speak
to his negligence with respect to safety and health issues not covered by
OSHA standards. And, as was clearly recognized in the legislative history,
standards-particularly consensus standards adopted wholesale without op-
portunity for full hearing-may be obsolete or inadequate or even counter-
productive of safety and health. 20 Further, even standards promulgated by
the Secretary of Labor after the most ample section 6 hearing may, as Paul
Brodeur's detailed and perceptive study suggests, emerge as less protective
of employees than a jury might find to be reasonable care for an employer
under all the circumstances.' 21 It follows, therefore, that compliance
11
' See Secretary of Labor v. Armor Elevator Co., 1 Occ. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. 1409 (OSHRC
Nov. 20, 1973).
119 0cc. Safety & Health Act § 12(i), 29 U.S.C. § 661(i) (1970); Secretary of Labor v. Armor
Elevator Co., 1 0cc. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. 1409 (OSHRC Nov. 20, 1973).
120 LEGISLATIVE HIsToRY 848.
121 Brodeur, Annals of Indushy-Casualties of the Workplace, NEW YORKER, Nov. 5, 1973, at 92.
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evidence should at most be admitted as evidence of due care, 22 thus re-
quiring the plaintiff to prove that the standard was inadequate and that
defendant's reliance upon it did not constitute due care under the circum-
stances.
Normally, compliance with the general duty will as a practical matter
absolve an employer from liability for negligence simply because the gen-
eral duty clause usually requires more than merely reasonable pre-
cautions.1 23 Practically, however, employers will rarely use compliance
with the general duty clause as a defense since it will be easier for a de-
fendant to show that he exercised reasonable care. Evidence of a practice
of diligently searching out and eliminating hazards which might other-
wise constitute general duty violations would, of course, constitute evidence
of reasonable care. There are instances, however, when compliance with
the general duty clause would not fulfill an employer's obligation to his
employees as business visitors under the common law. 124 In such cases
compliance with the employer's general duty is irrelevant to the issue of
his liability at common law.
Determinations by the Secretary of Labor or the OSHRC that a violation
does not exist should not be admissible in evidence by an employer to establish
his compliance with the Act: while employees may become parties to OSHRC
proceedings in cases where employers contest citations and penalties,'12 5
they may not themselves contest the Secretary's failure to issue citations or
penalties.1 26 For reasons similar to those which prohibit using collateral
estoppel against those who were not parties to the first action, adminis-
trative determinations exonerating an employer in non-contested cases
should not be permitted to be used defensively against an injured em-
ployee in a negligence action. But even in contested cases, where employ-
ees may become parties, OSHRC determinations should not be used defen-
sively; if they were to become admissible, employers' and employees' attorneys
might use the OSHRC forum to litigate their tort cases.
B. The Effect of Violation of an Employee's Duties
While the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 imposes a duty
on each employee to abide by "occupational safety and health standards
and all rules, regulations, and orders issued pursuant to this chapter which
are applicable to his own actions and conduct,' 127 Congress refrained from
providing any sanctions or machinery to enforce the duty. Further, the in-
tent is clear not to allow employee violations of their section 5(b) duties
to constitute a defense or excuse for violations of the employer's own
122 Morris 159.
123See note 116 supra.
124 See text at p. 617 supra.
125 Occ. Safety & Health Act § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1970).
126 The Act only provides for contest by an employer or employee representative on the ground
that the time fixed for abatement of a violation by the Secretary is unreasonable. Id.127 Id. § 5(b), 29 U.S.C. § 654(b).
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obligations under the Act.128 Essentially, the determination of what sanc-
tions might be imposed against violating employees was left to the pro-
cess of bargaining between employers and employee representatives. Thus,
except to the extent that such employee duties are enforceable in damages
actions brought by or against employees, the clause has no operative effect
other than, perhaps, to render unenforceable provisions in employer-em-
ployee agreements which call for violation of such duties.
Whether or not an employee violated his section 5(b) duty might be-
come relevant in at least three situations: (1) where an employee is suing
his employer or a third person for damages for employment-related in-
juries and the defendant pleads contributory or comparative negligence;
(2) where an employee is sued for damages by another employee or third
person for injuries caused by defendant's alleged failure to comply with
such duty;129 and (3) where an employer is sued by a third person to recover
for injuries caused by an employee's negligence.
Whether an employee's violation is relevant to such situations ought not
to turn on the presence or absence of sanctions against employees in the
Act itself. Whatever the reasons may have been for omitting such sanc-
tions, it is clear that there was no intent to absolve employees of their respon-
sibilities with respect to occupational safety and health. On the contrary,
there is recognition in the legislative history that, in order for the Act to
succeed, cooperation and compliance by employees is essential.130 That
Congress in order to achieve its preventive objectives decided to lay the
onus on employers should not, therefore, be taken as determining whether
employee violations of their own duties should affect compensation policies
applied in actions at law for damages.
Thus, in the relatively rare case where an employee retains the right to
sue his own employer for negligence causing on-the-job injury, the em-
ployer ought generally be permitted to introduce evidence of the em-
ployee's violation of a safety or health rule applicable to his own conduct
as evidence of the employee's contributory negligence; the rationale and
analysis here is much the same as that suggested above with respect to em-
ployer violations of safety standards. 3'
However, a subsidiary question arises: do the rules, regulations, and
orders issued pursuant to the Act-as contemplated by section 5(b)-include
rules promulgated by the employer in fulfillment of the employer's own gen-
eral or specific duties under the Act? For example, if an employer's gen-
eral duty is to supervise his employees to insure that none ride on the run-
ning board of a front end loader, does compliance with a company rule
prohibiting such riding rise to the level of an employee's section 5(b)
duty? As to this question the Act and its legislative history are silent.
The best response on policy grounds is also unclear because while an affirmative
228 LEGISLATIvE HISTORY 150-51, 851.
129 See, e.g., Skidmore v. Travelers Ins. Co., 356 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. La.), affd per curiam, 483
F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973).
130 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 150.
231 See text at pp. 630-31 supra.
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answer would further Congress' expressed interest in encouraging employee
compliance, it would also lower the incentive for employer supervision while
raising the incentive for an employer to issue clear-cut and detailed company
safety rules.1 32 A negative answer would have the opposite effect.
The answer to the question is important because violation of company
rules is generally not held to be evidence of negligence. 13 3 While the policy
usually offered to support this doctrine is to avoid discouraging industry from
adopting company safety rules more stringent than due care would ordinarily
require-by holding employers to the higher standard when they violate their
own rules' 34 -and while the result is just the opposite if the company can use
its own rules defensively against an employee, nevertheless some courts might
slavishly follow the doctrine even in the latter situation. By elevating such rules
to statutory employee duties under section 5(b) the likelihood that those courts
would properly treat violations of such rules as evidence of negligence would
be enhanced. But, unfortunately, so would the chance that violations would
erroneously be treated as conclusive of negligence, adding a significant bar-
rier to employee recovery.
If a statutory claim or defense will not be implied against an employee
for violations of his own section 5(b) duties,135 then in suits by or against an
employee, the effect of his violation of such duties will thus be the same whether
the situation is covered by section 4(4) or not: the violation should only be
deemed evidence of negligence.
C. Actions By Employees Against Third Parties
Section 4(4) prohibits effect upon "rights, duties and liabilities of employers
and employees under any law with respect to injuries, diseases, or death of
employees arising out of, or in the course of employment." The fact that Con-
gress thought the section dealt mainly, perhaps exclusively, with workmen's
compensation' 36 suggests strongly that only employees and their own employers
were covered. The use of the conjunctive in the section's language plus the
language drawn from workmen's compensation provides support for an inter-
pretation which would exclude employers other than those who employ the
employee seeking to enforce his rights. This interpretation is also consistent
with the general duty clause which explidtly limits the general duty to an em-
ployer's own employees.' 37
132 Thus providing itself with a convenient defense if an employee's injury should be caused
in part by the employee's failure to abide by the rule.133See C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 153 (2d ed. 1969).
134See generally Winters, The Evidentiary Value of Defendant's Safety Rules in a Negligence Action,
38 NEB. L. REv. 906 (1959).
1 See text at note 105 supra. The main reason would be that the state remedy is adequate.
However, in this situation the argument against upsetting workmen's compensation by providing
a duplicate remedy against the employer would not apply.
136 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 162, 864.
137 However, OSHRC Commissioner Cleary has argued convincingly that the definition of
employer and employee under the Act should be expanded to cover an employer who has the
ability to control the work environment with respect to hazards affecting other employers'
employees. See Secretary of Labor v. J.E. Roupp & Co., 1 0cc. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. 1680,
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Yet the duty to comply with the Act's standards is imposed on employers
and employees without limitation, and arguably that duty applies to all em-
ployers with respect to all employees-their own or another company's-who
might suffer the injury or disease the Act was intended to prevent. Arguments
that the general duty clause (which limits an employer's duty to his own em-
ployees) was intended also to limit the scope of the duty prescribed in section
5(a)(2) find no support in the Act or in its legislative history. Since virtually all
suppliers of equipment, machinery, chemicals, and contract services to places
of employment are themselves "employers," the next question is whether such
employers' duties to obey specific standards protects all employees, wherever
located or by whomever employed, who may be injured or suffer illness if
such standards are not complied with or whether the duty only protects em-
ployees who are either working in a workplace over which the employer charged
with the duty has some control or are under the control of the charged employer.
The short answer is that the Act seems intended to protect employees working
in workplaces over which the charged employer has some control or who are
under the control of the charged employer. 138 Thus, for example, one con-
tractor constructing a scaffold has a duty to obey relevant OSHA standards
which include within the umbrella of their intended protection the employees
of another contractor who may use the scaffold. And landowners-employers
who lease premises to other employers must obey OSHA standards with re-
spect to portions of the premises over which they retain control, for the
protection of their lessee's employees. On the other hand, manufacturers
of machinery, equipment, and chemicals for sale to other employers for
use off of the manufacturer's premises should not be deemed statutory
"employers" under the Act with respect to employees of the vendee-em-
ployer. Support for this position is fairly substantial in both the Act and its
legislative history: in general, the framers' focus of concern seemed rather
clearly to be on the workplace, 139 the safety of which is normally under the
control of employers. The definition of a safety or health standard suggests
also that practices and conditions in the workplace were the exclusive target.140
1681 (OSHRC Apr. 15, 1974) (dissent). There is nothing in the Act which is inconsistent with
that interpretation, cf. Occ. Safety & Health Act §§ 3(5), (6), 29 U.S.C. §§ 652(5), (6) (1970)
(definitions of employer and employee), and the more expansive view would strengthen the Act
in terms of its policy while bringing the scope of the general duty in line with the duty to obey
specific standards.
'S' The OSHRC has held that there must be a relationship of employer and employee-
meaning at least the right of the employer to control the employees, if not entirely the conventional
definition-before the "employer" can be held in violation for exposing the "employees" to a
hazard governed by a specific standard. See Secretary of Labor v. Humphreys & Harding, Inc.,
1 0cc. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. 1700 (OSHRC May 9, 1974). Further, it has held that an employer
is not liable for exposing another's employees to a hazard even if the employer has contracted to assume
the obligation. Id. There is no warrant in the Act or its policy for such a narrow reading of the scope
of the protection to be provided by the duty to obey specific standards. See id. at 1702-03 (dissent
by Commissioner Cleary). See also note 137 supra.139 See generally LEGISLATIVE HISTORY.
140 "The term 'occupational safety and health standard' means a standard which requires
conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or
processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places
of employment." Occ. Safety & Health Act § 3(8), 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1970). Although not con-
clusive, this definition more clearly addresses itself to steps within the control of an employer
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Most importantly, the entire enforcement and standard setting mechanism
established by the Act presupposes that the workplace is the relevant arena
and that those employers in control of it are the relevant targets of enforce-
ment.
141
Furthermore, and not less persuasive, is the common sense interpretation of
the word "employer" which in the context of the Act ought not to be stretched to
include employers who do not at least exercise some control over a workplace
in which the protected employees are working or over the employees themselves.
Policy considerations might well justify imposing OSHA duties on manufacturers
and suppliers of equipment, materials, and other substances used in the work-
place. Such imposition would tend to require the manufacturer and supplier
to internalize the costs of safety and health, thus increasing general deterrence.
At the same time, dangerous things might be kept out of the workplace instead of
being identified and rendered harmless after they come in or cause mischief.
However, for reasons to be discussed shortly, OSHA will probably achieve the
same result by means other than stretching the interpretation of the Act this far.
There is no basis consistent with this reasoning for implying statutory causes
of action in favor of employees against those who are not their statutory "em-
ployers.' u4 2 Further, even if the clause prohibiting the enlargement of employee
rights is narrowly construed, and thus limited to rights against the employee's
own employer, the reasons against implying a statutory cause of action to
support suits against other employers in control of the workplace 143 would not
seem to be overcome by the policies served by creating new causes of action;
employees will generally be able to bring negligence actions against such third
parties and benefit by asserting the violation as evidence of negligence. 144
Normally, this should be sufficient to get by a directed verdict.
But even if a statutory cause of action or negligence per se cannot be implied in
favor of employees in suits against third parties such as manufacturers and sup-
pliers of machinery, equipment, chemicals, and other substances, the Act is never-
theless likely to be of considerable assistance to employees and others who sue such
manufacturers or suppliers based on negligence or strict liability for defective
products. Whether or not such defendants owe a duty to plaintiff to comply
with OSHA standards, failure to comply with applicable standards without
sufficient justification-as where a manufacturer sells a machine knowing it
is to be used in a workplace without providing or offering to provide a safety
device required by the Act of statutory employers-should be held admissible
in an action against a manufacturer or supplier for several purposes: (1) to
establish defendant knew or should have known of the particular precaution
who has responsibility for working conditions in the workplace, than to a manufacturer or
supplier of equipment or chemical substances to a place of employment.141 Id. §§ 8-10, 29 U.S.C. §§ 657-59.
142Accord, Russell v. Bartley, 494 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 1974).
143 See text at note 105 supra.
144 The defendant employer, in such case, would be deemed an "employer" for purposes of the
duty clause, Occ. Safety & Health Act § 5, 29 U.S.C. § 654 (1970), but not for purposes of
the section prohibiting enlargement of common law rights, id. § 4(4), 29 U.S.C. § 653(4).
This is not inconsistent since, as suggested earlier, Congress may only have intended in section
4(4) to avoid upsetting rights between employers and employees in situations normally covered
by workmen's compensation. See text at p. 635 supra.
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demanded by the Act; (2) to establish that defendant should have been aivare
of the hazard avoided by the standard; (3) as evidence that a product lacking
the precaution is dangerous or defective; and, possibly (4) as evidence that
the precaution is feasible. While such evidence might be rebutted in a negligence
action by defendant's evidence that he nevertheless acted reasonably under
the circumstances applicable to him, or by showing in a products liability case
that the product, though dangerous, was not unreasonably so, or was not de-
fective,'1 45 admission of the Act's standard should buttress the plaintiffs case.
D. Actions Against OSHA Personnel for Failure to
Comply With Their Duties Under the Act
One of the versions of the Act, proposed in the House, provided that:
If the Secretary arbitrarily or capriciously issues or fails to issue an order under
subsection (a) and any person is injured thereby either physically or financially
by reason of such order or failure to issue such order, such person may bring
an action against the United States in the Court of Claims in which he may re-
cover the damages he has sustained, including reasonable court costs and at-
torneys' fees.1 46
In the final bill, this provision was left out in favor of a provision which provided
employees with a mandamus action against the Secretary of Labor if he failed
to seek an injunction against an imminent danger.1 47
The proposal and its final deletion, which followed a heated controversy
over other sections of the imminent danger provision, 148 should for that
reason not be taken to speak to the question whether compliance officers or
other personnel charged with the enforcement of the Act should be held
liable for negligent failures to perform their statutory duties if such negligence
leads to employee or employer injury.
The Act is otherwise silent on the question. In general, however, principles
developed in other analogous contexts, as where FAA inspectors negligently
certify aircraft as airworthy, 1 49 would seem to apply here. Nevertheless, a
few factors especially relevant to the Act deserve mention.
First, it is not clear that the "primary" duty of an employer to comply with
the Act is analogous to, for example, the primary duty of a pilot, which has
been held to insulate an FAA inspector from liability in suits arising out of
aircraft accidents. 150 The legislative history indicates that the employer's
duty under the Act was intended to be primary when compared with the em-
ployee's duty, not necessarily with that of third persons. It would seem pref-
erable, therefore, to apply ordinary proximate cause concepts to situations
145 See M. FRANKLIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 298-300 (1971).
146 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 838.
147 Occ. Safety & Health Act § 13(d), 29 U.S.C. § 662(d) (1970). See also LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
1193 (Conference Report).14
' See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 885-87.
149 Liability might accrue under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1970). See
Peters, Legal Responsibility of Government for Commercial Air Safety, 34 J. AIR L. & Com. 479 (1968).
Cf. Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 31 Ill. 2d 69, 199 N.E.2d 769 (1964); Annot., 6 A.L.R.2d
284 (1949).0 United States v. Miller, 303 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1962) (pilot operating under VFR conditions).
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in which an inspector negligently fails to note a violation of OSHA standards
or of the employer's general duty which subsequently results in an employee
injury.151 If the trier of fact finds that the employer's subsequent failure to
discover and remove the hazard was a "superseding cause," then the inspector
should not be held liable.152
Second, holding the government liable for the negligence of its employees
in enforcing the Act is likely to enhance the effectiveness of the enforcement
mechanism and thus serve Congress' objectives. Since the enforcement arm
is under the Secretary of Labor-and in view of widespread industry pressure
to provide more technical assistance to employers (and less enforcement) 153 -
the negligence remedy might strengthen employees' ability to ensure effective
enforcement under an administration less than enamored with the Act and
its methods. Such employee self-help is entirely consistent with the congressional
intent to provide employees effective participation in the Act's enforcement. 54
CONCLUSION
In order to assure safe and healthful working conditions for American
workers, the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 established a com-
prehensive regulatory scheme using prevention, interdiction, and deterrence
strategies to keep employment and the workplace free of safety and health
hazards. The Act, however, was not designed to achieve restoration of losses
for workers injured or made ill as a result of hazards in their employment;
the restoration systems-workmen's compensation and common law actions
for damages-were not to be affected. In construing the Act, therefore, the
primary source should be the Act itself and its legislative history, not doctrines
or policies drawn from tort law or the law of workmen's compensation. The
latter can only become relevant if they are shown to further the policies of
the Act better than other possible approaches.
An examination of the history of the Act reveals, however, that Congress
intended to provide workers, insofar as possible, virtually absolute protection
against serious work-related physical injuries and illnesses. To the extent that a
balance was required between the safety and health of employees and the eco-
nomic viability of employers, Congress came down heavily on the side of safety and
health. In that context, rules of law which qualify employer duties by allowing
serious dangers to exist if "reasonable under the circumstances," designed to
do justice between individual litigants when one of them is suing for damages,
cannot be permitted to qualify the stricter duties Congress imposed in order
to serve its remedial purposes. Nor can the difficulties of administration as-
sociated with the application of those rules be permitted to interfere with the
simple and effective administration of the Act.
151 Cf. Gibbs v. United States, 251 F. Supp. 391 (E.D. Tenn. 1965). The court stated that the
government's liability for the negligence of its inspectors "is subject to the same requirements
of negligence and causation as would affect the liability of a private person in the same circum-
stances." Id. at 400.2 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 440-52 (1965).
'1
3 See generally 1973 Oversight Hearings.
1
'
5 4 See LEGISLATIVE HIsToRY 150.
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Conversely, rules adopted by Congress without regard to restoration pol-
ides ought not to distort the rules and undermine the operation of systems
designed to restore losses and achieve justice between litigants. Therefore,
until Congress decides that new reparation schemes are necessary in order
to achieve better restoration, general deterrence, or both, new statutory
causes of action should not be implied from the safety and health duties im-
posed by the Act. On the other hand, permitting new safety and health stan-
dards developed under the Act to be used as appropriate standards of conduct
in common law damage actions will generally serve the Act's objectives and
be consistent with policies traditionally applied in such cases.
